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THE LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS TO PUNI-
TIVE DAMAGES IN PENNSYLVANIA.
Uncertainty in some phases of life may perhaps be an
advantage, but uncertainty as to questions of law is little
to be desired. Troublesome as it is at all times, it is never
more unfortunate than when it exists in respect to matters
of every-day importance and arises under conditions which
are likely to grow more and more prominent. All ques-
tions concerning corporations are of this character. And
when one considers the strong tendency in modem times
toward this form of business enterprise, the great increase
in numbers and powers of these corporate bodies, and the
varied fields of industry which they are entering, it would
seem almost imperative that all points of law in respect to
their duties and liabilities should be fixed with the greatest
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possible certainty. The question of the liability of a cor-
•porafion to 'unitive damages is one which has given rise
to much diversity of opinion at different times and in
different jurisdictions. The exact point which has caused
difficulty is this: Can a corporation be liable to punitive
damages for a wilful or grossly negligent tort of its agent
acting within the scope of his authority, although the cor-
poration has never expressly authorized or ratified the
agent's acts? That there has been hesitation and doubt
upon this question is illustrated by the Pennsylvania cases
in which it has been involved. For, while twenty years
ago it seemed settled beyond doubt in this state that a cor-
poration could be held liable for punitive damages under
the circumstances stated, nevertheless the tendency of the
later cases, although not definitely departing from the rule
laid down, indicates a reluctancy to apply it and casts
doubt upon its propriety. A brief review of a few cases
will show this.
The case referred to as settling the point in this' juris-
diction was that of Lake Shore and Michigan Southern
Railway Company v. Rosenzweig, 113 Pa. 519 (1886).
In that case the plaintiff was ejected by a conductor from
one of the defendant's trains at a dangerous spot in the
midst of many tracks, where trains were constantly running.
This was contrary to a rule of the company, which required
that persons should be put off trains at regular stations or
at dwelling-houses. The jury were instructed that under
these facts they might give a verdict for punitive damages.
The judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court, and
the rule as regards corporations was laid down in the fol-
lowing emphatic manner: "The liability of railway and
other corporations to exemplary damages for gross negli-
gence is well settled. The general rule in cases for neg-
ligence is that only compensatory damages can be given.
Juries are not at liberty to go farther than compensation,
unless the injury was done wilfully, or was the result of
that reckless indifference to the rights of others which is
equivalent to a violation of them. There must be wilful
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misconduct or that entire want of care which would raise
a presumption of conscious indifference to consequences
(Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company v. Armes, 91
U. S. R. 489). The corporation is liable for exemplary
damages for the act of its servant done within the Scope of
his authority under circumstances which would give such
right to the plaintiffs as against the servant were the suit
against him instead of the corporation." No case since has
expressly gone against the rule as thus stated, but there has
been a tendency shown in several opinions to regard it with
disapprobation. Thus, only two years later, in The Philadel-
phia Traction Company v. Orbann, 119 Pa. 37 (i888), the
court, citing R. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig and quoting the rule
as above, continues:
"There may be grave doubts expressed as to the pro-
priety of the rule, but if the doctrine of this case is adhered
to, the responsibility of a corporation in exemplary damages
for the wanton and wilful acts of its servants is clearly
established in Pennsylvania."
Keil v. Chartiers Valley Gas Company, 131 Pa. 466
(1889) was an action against a gas company for cutting
a ditch and laying pipe in an unauthorized manner upon
the plaintiff's land. The lower court instructed the jury
that they might impose exemplary damages if they thought
" from the testimony" there was aggravation, outrage, wil-
fulness, grossness, wilful disregard of a man's rights." The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment on the ground that
the question of exemplary damages should not have been
submitted to the jury. The concluding remarks of the
opinion by Williams, J., clearly show disapprobation of
the rule. He says: "Was the gas company to be punished
for the trespass of its employees, committed without its
knowledge and against its instructions by imposing smart
money on it? Unless there was evidence showing the
purpose of this company to oppress or injure the plaintiff
unnecessarily, or at the least showing culpable inattention
and neglect in the conduct of its affairs resulting in an
unnecessary injury to the plaintiff, there was no reason for
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imposing exemplary damages. The ends of justice are fully
met under ordinary circumstances when the employer makes
full compensation for the trespass of his employee, without
subjecting him to punishment for his employee's malice or
cruelty." Finally, in the very recent case of Arttherholt v.
Erie Elec. Motor Company, 27 Pa. Superior Court 141
(i9o5) where exemplary damages were recovered agailist
the corporation for assault and battery committed by a con-
ductor against a passenger, the Superior Court expressed
the opinion that the rule of R. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig had
met with much disfavor, but said " it is our plain duty to
adhere to it until it is distinctly overruled."
Since, then, a clear tendency to regard the rule with dis-
favor has been brought to our attention by so recent a case,
it is natural to inquire, What is the meaning of this ten-
dency? It would seem that it must mean one of two
things-First, that the courts, while recognizing that ordi-
narily a principal may be liable to punitive damages for the
torts of his agent, make a distinction between the cases
where a corporation is the principal and those in which
a natural person is the master; or second, that there is
doubt in regard to the propriety of ever holding a principal
liable to punitive damages for an act of his agent which
he has neither directly authorized nor ratified, even though
the act be done in the scope of the agent's employment.
As to the first suggestion, that there may be such a dis-
tinction between individual principals and corporate princi-
pals that an individual may be liable to punitive damages
for the acts of his agent when a corporation would not
be, it is submitted that no such distinction can be sound.
It is hard to see any theory upon which it can be based. The
early legal conception of corporations and their liabilities
has undergone complete change. The old doctrine that a
corporation could not commit torts, or be held liable for
the torts of its agents, was based upon the theory that the
charter of a corporation gave it no power to do wrongful
acts and hence the torts of its agents were committed by
them as individuals. This was soon abandoned and it
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was held that a corporation was liable in trespass, trover
and case just as an ordinary individual would be.1 Then
it was doubted whether a corporation could be liable for
offences against the rights of persons, such as assault and
battery. But this doubt also was early dispelled,2 and the
liability of a corporation for the acts of its agents has
repeatedly been recognized to be the same as that of a
natural person. In Pennsylvania this was held to be the
law as early as 1818 in the case of Turnpike Co. v. Rutter,
4 S. & R. 17, where Tilghman, C. J., declared: "But it is
objected that the present action is not on contract but on
tort, and a very refined argument is brought forward to
prove that a corporation cannot be guilty of a tort. A cor-
poration, say the defendant's counsel, is a mere creature of
law and can act only as authorized by its charter. But
the charter does not authorize it to do wrong, and there-
fore it can do no wrong. The argument is fallacious in
its principles and mischievous in its consequences, as it tends
to introduce actual wrongs and ideal remedies. It is much
more reasonable to say that when a corporation is authorized
by law to make a road, if any injury is done in the course
of making that road by the persons employed under its
authority, it shall be responsible in the same manner that
an individual is responsible for the actions of its servants
touching his business."
It has been urged, however, that although a corporation
may be liable in the same way as an individual for acts of
an agent, in which the wrongful intent plays no part, a
difference arises where motive or intent is the gist of the
wrong. And it is argued that it is more difficult to impute
wrongful motive or malice to a corporate principal than
to a natural person.3  Since exemplary damages are given
to punish malice and evil motive, they should be restricted
to those cases where natural persons are principals. There
are two objections which show the unsoundness of this
' Yarborough v. The Bank of England, 16 East 6.
'Eastern Counties R. C. v. Broom, 6 Exch. 314.
* Cf Field J. in Lothcop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 481.
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reasoning. In the first place, it was long ago declared that
" the doctrine that a corporation having no soul cannot be
actuated by a malicious motive, is more quaint than sub-
stantial."4
A corporation is controlled by human intelligence, and
to say that "a corporation cannot have motives and act
from motives is to deny the evidence of our senses, when
we see them transacting and effecting thereby results of
the greatest importance every day. And if they can have
any motives they can have a bad one. They can intend to
do evil as well as to do good. The interests of the com-
munity and the policy of the law demand that corporations
should be divested of every feature of a fictitious character
which shall exempt them from the ordinary liability of
natural persons for acts and injuries committed by them
and for them.5 " In accordance with this view, that a cor-
poration may.be liable for the tort of an agent where actual
malice or evil intent is an essential ingredient of the wrong,
it has been held in Pennsylvania that a corporation is liable
for fraud," and for malicious prosecution committed by
its agents.
In the second place, the argument that it is more difficult
to impute the malice of an agent to a corporate principal
than to an individual principal seems founded upon an
erroneous conception of the basis of the principal's responsi-
bility. This responsibility is imposed, not on the ground
that the act of the agent is the act of the principal in any
literal sense of those words, but on the ground that since
the law allows a principal to enjoy the privilege of represen-
tation through agents, the principal must in fairness be held
to the burden of liability for the agent's acts. Upon this
theory, provided the agent's acts are in the scope of his
business, so that the principal is really getting the benefit of
'Erle J. in Green v. London Omnibus Co., 7, C. B. N. S. 290.
'Church C. J. in Goodspeed v. Bank, 22 Conn. 530.
'Erie City Iron Works v. Barber, io6 Pa. 125.
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representation, it can make no difference whether the princi-
pal is a corporation or a natural person; whether the act -be
malicious or not. If the principal is responsible for the
wrong it must be for the whole wrong, including the malice.
It seems, therefore, impossible to find any good grounds
for exempting a corporation from exemplary damages where
a natural person would be liable, and this brings us to the
consideration of the second suggestion in regard to the
tendency of the Pennsylvania cases, namely, that it may
mean that there is doubt in regard to the propriety of ever
holding a principal liable to punitive damages for an act
of his agent which he has neither directly authorized nor
ratified. It is not within the scope of this article to
attempt a discussion of the benefits or evils arising from
the application of the doctrine of punitive damages to cases
of principal and agent. But it is submitted that if the
tendency really is one toward the overthrow of the theory
of punitive damages in cases of agency, it is extremely
unfortunate that the beginning was made in cases of cor-
porations, for it seems that, if there is any value whatsoever
in the doctrine, it works to greatest advantage and can
be least excepted to in those cases where the corporation
is the principal. There are two strong reasons for holding
this view. The first is that, since a corporation can act only
by and through its agents, the act of an agent is far more
truly the act of the corporation than in any case of individual
master and servant. Indeed, although the courts have
applied the principles of law governing master and servant
to corporations, it seems possible that the corporation, as
a whole, might be held liable upon a somewhat different
ground for the acts of a so-called agent. So-called agent,
I say, because in strict truth he is not an agent at all but
a member, a part of the corporation itself. It is impossible
to conceive of that invisible intangible being, created by
law and called a eorporation, as existing outside of and
apart from the directors, officers and agents through which
it acts. They are the corporation, and when they act within
.he scope of the business of the corporation, the corporation
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itself is present and acting in a way that no individual
principal can ever be said to act in the person of his agent.
If this fundamental conception that a corporation is not
an entity real or fictional with an existence separate or dis-
tinct from the individuals who compose it be accepted I sub-
mit that it furnishes a strong reason for subjecting corpora-
tions to exemplary damages.
But even if the view just presented be not accepted
there is an additional reason for holding that the doctrine
of exemplary damages is especially applicable to corpora-
tions. It exists in the fact that there is no way of reaching
them save through money damages. For whether we con-
ceive of a corporation as a group of persons so organized
as to be able to act only through duly appointed repre-
sentatives or as ideal beings existing only through opera-
tion of law they are not vulnerable in the many ways
that a natural person is. The pinch of the purse alone
causes them to wince, and this one method therefore of
holding them accountable should not be relaxed. These
ideas and the reasoning here given are not original. They
have been recognized and acted upon by authorities. An
extract from an opinion in a Maine case presents the idea
well: "We confess that it seems to us that there is no
class of cases where the doctrine of exemplary damages can
be more beneficially applied than to railroad corporations
in their capacity of common carriers of passengers; and it
might as well not be applied to them at all as to limit its
application to cases where the servant is directly or impliedly
commanded by the corporation to maltreat and insult a pas-
senger, or to cases where such an act is directly or impliedly
ratified; for no such cases will ever occur. A corporation
is an imaginary being. It has no mind but the mind of
its servants; it has no voice but the voice of its servants;
and it has no hands with which to act but the hands of its
servants. All its schemes of mischief, as well as its schemes
of public enterprise, are conceived by human minds and
executed by human hands; and these minds and hands are
its servant's minds and hands. All attempts, therefore, to
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distinguish between the guilt of the servant and the guilt
of the corporation; or the malice of the servant and the
malice of the corporation; or the punishment of the servant
and the punishment of the corporation, is sheer nonsense,
and only tends to confuse the mind and confound the judg-
ment. Neither guilt, malice nor suffering is predicable of
this ideal existence called a corporation. And yet, under
cover of its name and authority, there is, in fact, as much
wickedness and as much that is deserving of punishment
as can be found anywhere else. And since these ideal
existences can neither be hanged, imprisoned, whipped nor
put in the stocks,-since, in fact, no corrective influence can
be brought to bear upon them except that of pecuniary loss,
it does seem to us that the doctrine of exemplary damages
is more beneficial in its application to them, than in its
application to natural persons."" In a Pennsylvania case,
already cited, Turnkey, J., gave similar reasons for holding
a corporation liable in a stricter manner than a natural
person,9 and the principle has been approved by text
writers.1 0
It would seem, therefore, that on principle, and in con-
formity to doctrines already laid down in previous cases
within the jurisdiction, there should be no hesitancy or
reluctance in applying the rule of punitive damages as
stated in R. R. Co. v. Rosenzweig strictly in corporation
cases. If a movement toward repudiating the doctrine of
punitive damages in case of agency is contemplated it
should have its origin, not* in corporation cases, but in cases
where the principal is a natural person.
Edward W. Evans.
Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869).
Erie City Iron Works v. Barber, io6 Pa. 137.
" Sutherland on Damages, 3rd Ed. S. 95o. Harris, Damages by
Corporations, S. 249.
